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Despite the recent decision of the House of Lords in the Guinness Mahon 
case, which provided answers to some unanswered questions in the 
difficult area of restitution, many other questions still remain. In this article 
Lord Millett describes the current 'state of play', detailing in particular 
some of the remaining areas of possible controversy.
The case of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council ([1996] AC 669) left unanswered the difficult question of precisely what was the ground of 
restitution in that instance. Was it want of consideration, as the 
Court of Appeal held? Was it total failure of consideration, as 
Lord Browne - Wilkinson suggested? Was it partial failure of 
consideration, which was my own preferred ground? Or was it 
mistake of law? The subsequent House of Lords decision in 
Guiness Mahon &. Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London 
Borough Council ([1998] 2 All ER 272) answered this and other 
questions raised, but more remain to be addressed in this most 
difficult area of law.
COMMON LAW & EQUITY
In this article I intend to concentrate on two questions which 
lie at the intersection of restitution and equity First, is the 
application of the equitable tracing rules subject to a 
requirement that there must be a fiduciary relationship which 
permits the assistance of: equity to be invoked? Secondly, when is 
a proprietary remedy available for a restitutionary claim?
Before attempting to answer these questions I wish to draw 
attention to one particular matter. The greatest single difficulty 
which English judges face in developing a coherent law of 
restitution lies in the duality of English law   in the division 
between common law and equity. The law of restitution was 
developed separately in the common law courts and the Court of 
Chancery. Yet they dealt with very similar kinds of case. They 
both dealt, for example, with claims for the repavment of money- 
paid by mistake. They both dealt with rogues who embezzled 
money and gave it to their mistresses or used it to pay their 
gambling debts. They adopted very similar approaches to resolve 
the issues which arose, but they used different language and 
sometimes applied different standards. This is because they had 
different concepts of property and provided successful suitors 
with different remedies. Recognition of the fact that cases 
previously thought to have no connecting feature are based on a 
single, unifying principle   the reversal of unjust enrichment   is 
gradually enabling the law to be rationalised and older and 
obsolete rules to be discarded. But difficulties remain because,
however much we may wish to unify' the law of restitution, we 
must reserve and distinguish between the legal and equitable 
concepts of property.
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION *
The structure of the law of restitution is now firmly 
established. It has two main divisions: unjust enrichment by 
subtraction (or autonomous unjust enrichment) and unjust 
enrichment by wrongdoing (or dependent unjust enrichment). 
But unjust enrichment by subtraction can also be subdivided, for 
it covers two quite different kinds of case. There is the usual 
two-party case, in which A pays money or transfers property to 
B and afterwards claims to recover it because the payment or 
transfer was made (for example) by mistake. The swap cases are 
of this character, as are most of the cases which have recently 
been considered by the House of Lords.
But there is another kind of case which is increasingly 
common. This is the three-party case, in which A has power to 
deal with B's property and wrongfully transfers legal title to the 
property to C. In such a case B sues to recover his own property; 
in civil law terms, he vindicates his title. German law locates 
such cases in the law of property, not unjust enrichment. 
Because English law recognises that legal title has passed, most 
English commentators have in the past treated these cases as 
falling within the law of restitution, though this has recently 
become controversial. Some argue that these cases are cases of 
unjust enrichment; others that they are part of the law of 
restitution but do not respond to unjust enrichment; others that 
they are not part of the law of restitution at all. I have to say that 
judges are profoundly uninterested in this kind of dispute. They 
take the pragmatic view that classification is important only as an 
aid to analysis and where correct classification is capable of 
affecting the outcome of the dispute.
Two- and three-party cases distinguished
It is important, however, to distinguish between the two-party 
and three-party cases because they are governed by different 
rules. The ground of restitution in the three-party cases is called 
'ignorance' by Professor Birks and 'powerlessness' by Professor
Burrows, in what appears to be an attempt to include theme 
within the restitutionary scheme. I prefer to call the ground of 
restitution 'want of title', which some will assume shows that I 
incline towards membership of the vindication of property rights 
school. But this does not matter. What does matter is that we 
should recognise that the three-party cases are subject to special 
rules:
(1) The bona fide purchaser defence is limited to this kind of 
case; it has no part to play in the two-party case. In this it 
differs from the change of position defence, which applies 
to both kinds of case.
(2) In the two-party case, where the defendant receives the 
property directly from the plaintiff, there is no need for the 
plaintiff to undertake the tracing exercise in order to prove 
that the defendant's enrichment was at his expense. The 
plaintiff does not have to prove his title to the property-, 
because the defendant is in no position to dispute it; his 
right to retain the property depends on the plaintiff having 
the right to deal with it. But the plaintiff does have to 
undertake the tracing exercise in the three-party case, 
where the defendant does not receive the property directly 
from the plaintiff. In the absence of a direct nexus, the 
plaintiff has to prove that the property which the defendant 
received represents 'his property and not the property of
someone else'
MERELY A PROCESS
Tracing is not a right or remedy ... It is merely the process by which 
the plaintiff identifies some asset ... as sufficiently representing an 
asset which formerly belonged to him.
TRACING
This brings me to the first of the two questions with which I 
wish to deal, which is concerned with tracing. It is the receivedo
wisdom that there are different rules for tracing at common law 
and in equity; that the equitable rules are superior, because (for 
example) the common law cannot trace into or out of a mixed 
bank account; but that there must be some fiduciary or trust 
relationship to justify' the application of the equitable tracing 
rules.
There is binding authority of the Court of Appeal for all these 
propositions. In Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 at p. 518 that court 
held that the common law and equity proceeded upon different 
theories of tracing and that, unlike equity, the common law 
cannot trace money which is paid into a mixed bank account, 
that is to say an account into which other money is paid whether 
before or after the money which is the subject of the tracing 
exercise. In Agip (Africa) Ltd vJackson [f 99 f] Ch 547 at p. 566 the 
Court of Appeal held that it is a precondition of the right to trace 
in equity that there must be a fiduciary relationship which calls 
the equitable jurisdiction into being. In his book on tracing, 
Lionel Smith has convincingly argued that each of these 
propositions rests upon inadequate authority and that none of 
them can be supported in principle.
I have never understood why it should be thought that the 
common law cannot trace through a mixed bank account. I have 
suggested that the real difficulty is not with tracing but with 
following. Where A wishes to trace the credit in his bank account
at bank X into B's credit in his bank account at bank Y, A has to 
undertake two exercises. He has to trace and follow. He has to 
follow the money from hand to hand   from A to B   as well as 
trace out of bank X and into bank Y. Where the money is paid 
by cheque there is no difficulty' in following the cheque from A 
to B; the only question is whether A can trace the money 
standing to his credit at bank X into the cheque and the cheque 
into its proceeds which are represented by the money credited 
to B's account at bank Y. But this analysis will not help where 
there is an electronic transfer of funds because there is nothing 
to follow. We speak of tracing the money; but we speak 
metaphorically. No money moves through the clearing system. 
All that happens is that A's account is debited and, as a result of 
a series of consequential credits and debits, B's account at a 
different bank is credited. The credits and debits between the 
banks are netted off within the clearing system and any so-called 
money flows may be in the opposite direction. Equity does not 
follow the money; there is no money to follow. It identifies the 
money credited to B's account as representing the money 
debited to A's account because the credit and debit are causally 
and transactionally linked. The question is whether the common 
law does the same.
I do not think that we need to answer this question now that 
we have at last recognised the nature of the tracing exercise. 
Tracing is not a right or a remedy. It has nothing to do with the 
nature of the claim. It is merely the process by which the plaintiff 
identifies some asset, in the hands of the defendant, as 
sufficiently representing an asset which formerly belonged to 
him. The new asset is treated as a substitute for the original asset 
and is subject to the same claims. These need not be proprietary. 
Tracing may be necessary in order to establish the availability of 
a personal claim.
Given the nature of the tracing exercise, it is self-evident that 
we do not need two sets of tracing rules, one in aid of a claim ato
common law and one in aid of a claim in equity, each with 
different defects. As Lionel Smith has observed, there is nothingO
particularly legal or equitable about the tracing process. There is 
no logic in requiring the existence of a fiduciary or trust 
relationship as a precondition of the right to apply the equitable 
tracing rules. The rule is probably based on a misunderstanding 
of what the Court of Appeal said in Re Diplock [f948] Ch 465 at 
p. 520 537. The court insisted on the necessity of establishing, 
as a starting point,
'the existence of a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty or of a continuing 
right of property recognised in equity ...'.
This was not a precondition for the application of equity's 
tracing rules, but a precondition for the availability of a 
proprietary claim. The remarks were made in the context of a 
long passage in which the court was describing what was 
necessary to 'give rise to the equitable right of property'. 
Insistence on the existence of a fiduciary relationship or 
continuing right of property- recognised by equity is justified as a 
precondition to the existence of a proprietary claim; such a 
claim must have what Professor Birks calls 'a proprietary base'. 
If proprietary remedies are made generally available for breach 
of purely personal rights the difference between personal and 
proprietary rights is dangerously eroded.
The best way forward, in my opinion, is either to assert, with 
Lionel Smith, that there is nothing either legal or equitable about
the tracing exercise, and that there is only one set of rules which 
is applicable both at common law and in equity; or to assert with 
Viscount Haldane LC in Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 at 
p. 42 1 that the equitable tracing rules form part of equity's 
auxiliary jurisdiction and are available to support a common law 
claim. On either footing no further time need be wasted on 
trying to breathe life into the common law tracing rules, which 
can be left to fall into disuse, as the common law action for 
account did centuries ago. The way will be open to a unified law 
of restitution.
interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of 
another. Well known examples of such a constructive trust 
are McCormick v Grogan (1869) 4 App Casd 82 (a case of a 
secret trust) and Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897) 1 Ch 196 
(where the defendant agreed to buy property for the 
plaintiff but the trust was imperfectly recorded). Another 
example is Pallant v Morgan (1953) Ch 43 (where the 
defendant sought to keep for himself property which he had 
agreed to buy for both parties).
on the
AVAILABILITY OF A REMEDY
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This leaves the second and more difficult question: 
when is a remedy available lor a restitutionary claim? 
Only equity provides proprietary remedies, so the 
answer must be found in equitable doctrine. The law 
of restitution tells us only whether the personal 
remedy of account and payment is available. In order 
to discover whether there is a proprietary remedy we 
must turn to the law ot property, and specifically to that part of 
the law of property which falls within the province of equity.
There is no doubt that proprietary relief is available in the 
three-party cases where the ground of restitution is want of title. 
It seems that it may also be available in some other situations, 
but the criteria for its availability are unclear. The Canadian 
Supreme Court makes it widely available; indeed, it is the 
primary remedy in Canada, which has adopted the so-called 
remedial constructive trust. The English and Australian courts 
have so far rejected the remedial constructive trust. Thev are 
likely to retain the personal remedy as the primary remedy, and 
allow a proprietary remedy only when particular conditions are 
satisfied.
This question is usually discussed in terms of the constructive 
trust. This is unfortunate, for the expressions 'constructive 
trust' and 'constructive trustee' are used in a variety of different 
senses, and they serve only to cause confusion. The expression 
'constructive trustee', lor example, has at least six different
(1) A person who assumes the role of a trustee and takes it 
upon himsell to deal with the trust property on behalf of 
the beneficiaries although he has not been formally 
appointed as such. He is sometimes called a 'trustee de son 
tort'. He is really a de facto trustee rather than a 
constructive trustee, for he is a trustee in the fullest sense 
of the term. Only formal appointment is lacking.
(2) A director of a company or other fiduciary in possession or 
control of property belonging to another, who does not 
have legal title, and so is not strictly a trustee. He is in an 
analogous position and is treated as if he were a trustee. He 
is really a quasi-trustee.
(3) A person in a fiduciary position who abuses the trust and 
confidence reposed in him in order to obtain his principal's 
property for himself. He is properly described as a 
constructive trustee, for he holds the property from the 
moment he obtains it on constructive trust for his 
principal. A constructive trust arises by operation of law 
whenever the circumstances are such that it would be 
unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not 
necessarily the legal estate) to assert his own beneficial
Visit the above web site for a discussion of trust la., 
including reference to the 'remedial constructive trus? 
http://journal.law.mcgill.ca/abs/422hoegn.thm for an article from the McGill 
Law Journal on remedial constructive trusts by Stuart Hoegner.
This third group differs from the first two in that the 
defendant seeks to keep the property for himself, but is not 
allowed to do so. But the plaintiff does not impugn the 
transaction by which the defendant obtained the property. He 
alleges that the circumstances in which the defendant obtained it 
make it unconscionable for him to deny that he holds it in trust.
However, in each of these first three groups the trust is a real 
trust. The trustee is a real trustee and is subject to fiduciary 
obligations. It was classified as an express trust for limitation 
purposes, though it was nothing of the kind. Every fiduciary 
relationship is a voluntary relationship. No one can be 
compelled to enter into a fiduciary relationship or accept 
fiduciary obligations. In the first two groups the trustee willingly 
accepts his role and the fiduciary obligations which it entails. In 
this third group he does not; but he voluntarily places himself in 
a position where he is obliged by equity to act in the interests of 
the beneficiaries and not his own.
(4) Unfortunately the expression 'constructive trust' is also 
confusingly used of anyone who holds property on an 
implied trust, whether constructive or resulting. The legal 
owner who holds property on a resulting trust is not 
normally described as a 'resulting trustee'. It is customary 
to call him a constructive trustee.
(5) To add to the confusion, the expression 'constructive 
trustee' is also used to describe any defendant who is liable 
to be subjected to an equitable proprietary remedy. The 
court declares him to be a constructive trustee and orders 
him to transfer the trust property in specie to the plaintiff. 
But to say that he is a constructive trustee of the property 
is only another way of saying that he is liable to transfer it 
in specie to the plaintiff. The defendant is not a true 
trustee, for he owes no fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff.
The commonest example of this kind of constructive trust 
arises on the sale of land. It is well established that a contracting 
vendor of land holds the land on a constructive trust for the 
purchaser. But he is not a fiduciary. The constructive trust is 
only another way of saying that the vendor's undertaking to 
convey the land to the purchaser is specifically enforceable. This 
results in the separation of the legal and equitable ownership, 
but it creates no fiduciary relationship between the parties. In
these last two groups the expression 'constructive trust' is used 
in a remedial sense to describe a particular kind of proprietary 
remedy, and even as shorthand for saying that proprietary relief 
is available in equity. In fact the constructive trust is only one 
form of proprietary remedy which equity makes available. The 
equitable charge and equitable subrogation are two others.
Thus the expression 'constructive trust' may be used in an 
institutional sense, when it is used in contra-distinction to other 
kinds of trust such as the express or resulting trust; or in a 
remedial sense, when it is used in contra-distinction to other 
proprietary remedies such as a charge or subrogation or to 
purely personal remedies such as equitable compensation or 
account.
(6) So far, the constructive trust arises in the context of equity's 
exclusive jurisdiction and yields a proprietary remedy. 
Unfortunately, however, it is also used in a completely 
different sense to justify the intervention of equity to grant 
relief against fraud. Such relief is always personal and takes
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the form of equitable compensation. It may arise in the 
course of equity's exclusive jurisdiction, as in the cases of 
knowing assistance, where the defendant is made liable to 
account 'as constructive trustee' because he is implicated in 
a breach of trust committed by others. But it seems it may 
also arise in the course of equity's concurrent jurisdiction, 
where equity awards compensation more generally for 
fraud. These cases differ from the others, for the plaintiff 
impugns the transaction by which the defendant obtained 
or dealt with the property. The expression 'constructive 
trust' is misleading, for there is no trust and the defendant 
is not a trustee. The expression is 'nothing more than a 
formula for equitable relief (see Selangor United Rubber 
Estates Ltd v Cradock [1968] 1 WLR 1555 at p. 1582 per 
Ungoed-Thomas I). We would avoid confusion if we were
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to drop the reference to 'constructive trustee' and say that 
the defendant was 'liable to account in equity'.
Three-party cases
Given these various meanings of the expression 'constructive 
trust', we would be well advised to drop it from the vocabulary 
of subtractive unjust enrichment altogether, and ask simply 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to a proprietary remedy. In the 
three-party case, where the plaintiff traces his property- into the 
hands of the defendant there is no doubt that he is entitled to 
proprietary relief. Traditionally he asks the court to declare that 
the defendant is a constructive trustee of the property and to 
restore the property in specie. But the usage is particularly 
misleading for, as Dr Chambers has convincingly demonstrated,
O ' O -' '
the trust which is operating is not a constructive trust at all but 
a resulting trust. This is important, because it avoids the injustice 
of subjecting the defendant to fiduciary obligations.
Two-party cases
The question then, is whether a proprietary remedy is ever 
available in the two-party case and, if so, what criteria determine 
its availability. One answer suggests itself immediately: when theJ oo J
ground for restitution is want of title. This is not in fact confined 
to the three-party case, as I may appear to have suggested. There 
are two kinds of two-party case where there clearly is a 
proprietary claim. One is where there is a defect in the payment 
or transfer itself. Where this is ultra vires the transferor, illegal or
void, no title passes to the recipient. But the defect must be in 
the actual payment or transfer itself. It is not sufficient that the 
payment or transfer is, for example, for an illegal purpose. 
Unless the payment or transfer itself is illegal, title passes. The 
same applies a fortiori to payments or transfers for ultra vires 
purposes.
The other is merely an extension of the three-party case. The 
rule of equity is that the beneficial interest is not defeated by a 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty. It is enforceable against anyone 
who takes the property in which the interest subsists except a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Liability to make 
restitution is strict, for it is not fault-based. There is no need for 
the principal to rescind the transaction in order to revest the 
beneficial interest; it is as if it never left him, for it never 
accompanied the legal title. But if the fiduciary cannot pass the 
beneficial ownership to a third party, he equally cannot take it for 
himself. So a fiduciary who acquires his principal's property in 
breach of his fiduciary duty is liable to restore it in specie to his 
principal. An example of such a case is Stump v Gaby (1852) 
2 De G M&G 623. A solicitor bought land from his client in 
circumstances which made the conveyance liable to be set aside 
on equitable grounds. The client then devised the land by his 
will. Lord St Leonards LC held that the land passed under the 
will. The client retained a devisable interest in the land, for in 
the view of this court he remained the owner.
Since the client was able to devise the land by his will he 
clearly retained an equitable interest in the land, presumably by 
way of resulting trust. But it was not treated as an equitable 
interest for all purposes. When it came to questions of priority 
it was classified as a mere equity, not binding a bona fide 
purchaser of an equitable interest in the land without notice: 
Phillips v Phillips (1862) 4 De G F&J 208. The cases are discussed 
in Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrill Pty Ltd (1965) 1 1 3 at p. 265. 
This refinement need not detain us.
The main class of two-party restitutionary case, however, is 
where the plaintiff pays away his money by a valid payment, fully 
intending to part with the beneficial interest to the recipient, but 
his intention is vitiated by some factor such as fraud, 
misrepresentation, mistake and so on. In all these cases the 
beneficial interest passes, but the plaintiff has the right to elect 
whether to affirm or rescind the transaction. If he elects to 
rescind it, it is usually assumed that the beneficial title revests in 
the plaintiff retrospectively, and that the plaintiff can maintain a 
proprietary claim. But the recipient cannot anticipate his 
decision. Pending the plaintiff's election to rescind, the recipient 
is entitled   and may be bound   to treat the payment as 
effective. The plaintiff's subsequent rescission does not 
invalidate or render wrongful transactions which have taken 
place in the meantime on the faith of the receipt.
RESCISSION OR RESULTING TRUST?
It is tempting to equate the position with that which arises in 
the three-party case or its extension, the two-party case where 
the ground for restitution is want of title. Dr Chambers does so 
in his book on resulting trusts. He even suggests that the equity 
to rescind is in reality 'a resulting trust in disguise'.
I venture to disagree with this analysis. Rescission and the 
resulting trust are two different equitable responses to unjust 
enrichment and they need to be kept separate. In the Westdeutschc
Landesbank case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained why a 
payment by mistake does not give rise to a resulting trust. A 
resulting trust arises whenever the legal estate is transferred but 
the person at whose expense it is transferred does not intend the 
beneficial interest to pass to the recipient. It is defeated by 
evidence that the person at whose expense the property has been 
transferred intended to make a gift or loan; but these are not the 
only circumstances in which a resulting trust may be rebutted. It
J O J
may be rebutted by any explanation which demonstrates an 
intention to pass the beneficial interest to the recipient. 
Evidence that he transferred the property by mistake, for 
example, or for a consideration which has failed, rebuts the 
resulting trust.
Dr Chambers rejects the distinction between property 
transferred or obtained in breach of fiduciary duty and property' 
obtained by a transaction which is voidable for mistake, 
misrepresentation and the like. But there is a real distinction 
between property obtained, albeit improperly, by a transaction at 
arms' length and with the knowledge and consent of the 
beneficial owner, and property obtained without his knowledge 
and consent by a fiduciary exploiting his position for his own 
benefit. In the second kind of case, as we have seen, the plaintiff 
does not have to rescind the transaction in order to revest the 
beneficial title in himself; it is treated as never having left him.
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Of course he must elect whether to make a claim, and if he waits 
too long his claim may be barred by laches and acquiescence. 
But in the meantime he has a transmissible equitable interest in 
the property arising by way of resulting trust.
In the first kind of case the position is very different. The 
transaction stands in equity as well as at law until rescinded. 
Pending rescission the recipient has the whole legal and 
beneficial interest in the property, though his beneficial title is 
defeasible. There is no fiduciary relationship. The defeasible 
nature of the transferee's title should not inhibit his use of the 
property. Any right which the transferor has to retransfer in 
specie after rescission, is best regarded not as a response to a 
constructive or resulting trust, but as part of the working out of 
the equitable remedy of rescission. If this is the correct analysis, 
then the right to retransfer in specie is a form of specific 
performance which equity makes available because a money 
judgment is an inadequate remedy, and this means that it should 
be confined to cases of land or other property of unique value to 
the transferor.
What distinguishes the two cases is not the presence of a 
fiduciary relationship. It may be present in both. Nor is it the 
distinction between the two-party case and the three-party case. 
It is the distinction drawn by Brennan J in Daly v Sydney Stock 
Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR at p. 271 between property- 
obtained, whether by a fiduciary or not, by means of a voidable
transaction, and property obtained in breach of fiduciary duty.
Can this analysis be supported by the authorities? I believe 
that it can. Dr Chambers cites five authorities in support of his 
thesis that a proprietary remedy is available whenever money is 
paid or property is transferred by a voidable transaction which is 
afterwards rescinded. The authorities are: Stump v Gaby; Gresley v 
Nousley (1859) 4 De G&J 78; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) 1 Eq 337; 
Melbourne Banking Corp v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 and 
Phillips v Phillips. With one exception they are all cases where a 
conveyance of land was set aside on equitable grounds for breach 
of fiduciary duty. They can all be justified on either of the two 
grounds I have mentioned. The one exception is the Melbourne 
Banking case, where an assignment of the equity of redemption 
in land was set aside for misrepresentation. That can be 
supported on my thesis either on the ground that the subject 
matter of the transaction was land, or that it was itself the 
creature of equity. None of them is authority for any wider 
availability of a proprietary remedy for mistake or 
misrepresentation.
There remains a residue of other cases where the obligation to 
make restitution arises from other causes. These need to be 
considered separately but they support my thesis. It is sufficient 
to take one example: the claim to recover money paid in 
anticipation of a contract which does not materialise. If the 
plaintiff can overcome the main problem which he faces, that of 
showing that he did not knowingly take the risk that the contract 
would not materialise, he may have a personal claim to 
restitution. There is, however, no basis on which he can assert a 
proprietary claim unless he can establish a Quistclose trust. It is 
not sufficient to show that he paid the money for a purpose 
which has failed. He must show that he paid it to the intent that 
it should be used for the stated purpose and for no other 
purpose. This is what precludes the recipient from treating the 
money as his own and creates a trust in favour of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
So I suggest that there are two situations, and two situations
oo
only, in which proprietary restitutionary remedies are available 
for subtractive unjust enrichment. The first is where he can 
establish a continuing beneficial interest in the property to 
which he lays claim. Such an interest will almost invariably arise 
under a resulting trust. The second arises where the original 
transfer was voidable and has been rescinded and specific 
retransfer is ordered because monetary restitution would not be 
an adequate remedy. By confining proprietary relief to these 
cases we will be applying the true ratio of Re Diplock and 
distinguishing between cases where there is a breach of trust or 
fiduciary duty and other cases, not for the purpose of applying 
the equitable tracing rules, but for the purpose of allowing a 
proprietary remedy. In the absence of a right to specific 
reconveyance after rescission, which may depend on the nature 
of the property', it should be a necessary precondition for 
proprietary restitutionary relief. @
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